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FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III
PLACES IN THE HEARTLAND:
DEPARTURE JURISPRUDENCE AFTER
KOON
Frank 0. Bowman, III*
There are two things upon which I suspect most
observers will agree following the decision in Koon v.
United States.' First, the United States Supreme Court
wants district courts to have more discretion to depart
from the otherwise applicable guideline range, and
wants appellate courts to have less authority to
overturn those discretionary judgments. Second, in
light of the conflicting signals the Court gave by, on
the one hand, declaring that the standard of appellate
review for departure decisions is to be "abuse of
discretion," and on the other hand, finding that two
of the five factors relied upon by the district court in
its departure decision were improper, it is virtually
impossible to predict the practical effect of Koon on
the daily work of the lower federal courts.
I am not going to attempt any sort of augury
here. Rather, I will note what seem to me to be some
defects in the approach taken by the Court, defects
which both render the opinion unconvincing and
make the lower courts' task of reading Koon's entrails
extraordinarily difficult.
Koon is a case about institutional roles. The
project of the majority opinion is to justify a reallocation of authority over departure decisions away from
both the Sentencing Commission and the courts of
appeals. But the Court's argument in favor of the
shift toward increased district court departure
authority rests on a series of claims that are either
legally or factually unsupportable.
The Argument from Statutory Construction and
Congressional Intent
The Court argues that the Sentencing Reform Act
(SRA) preserves a broad grant of sentencing discretion to district court judges. The majority writes:
We agree that Congress was concerned about
sentencing disparities, but we are just as convinced that Congress did not intend, by establishing limited appellate review, to vest in appellate
courts wide-ranging authority over district court
sentencing decisions. Indeed, the text of [18
U.S.C.] § 3742 manifests an intent that district
courts retain much of their traditional sentencing
2
discretion.
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With the utmost respect to the Justices, this is
pure banana oil. Pre-guidelines, the "traditional
sentencing discretion" of district courts was virtually
limitless, and the power of appellate courts to review
the exercise of that discretion was virtually nil. As the
Koon court itself noted, "Before the Guidelines system,
a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits
was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on
appeal." 3 The whole point of the guidelines was to
hem in district courts with a set of rules created by the
Commission and enforced by courts of appeals.
This is not to say that district courts operating
under the guidelines have no sentencing discretion.
They do. However, one must distinguish between
types of discretion exercised under the guidelines.
District court judges do exercise something very much
akin to their "traditional sentencing discretion" when
selecting a sentence within the applicableguideline range.
That is, just as before the guidelines, a judge may
impose a sentence anywhere within the range without
offering any explanation whatever.' However, to
suggest, as the Court plainly does in Koon, that a
decision to departfrom the sentencing range prescribed by
the guidelines is discretionary in the same way that all
sentencing before the guidelines was discretionary, or
in the same way that imposition of a sentence within
the guideline range is now discretionary, is to
disembowel the guidelines at a stroke. If discretion to
depart were in truth a remnant of "traditional
sentencing discretion" preserved to sentencing judges
by the SRA, then the guidelines would be advisory
rather than mandatory.
Similarly, the Court's suggestion that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742 "manifests an intent" by Congress to make
departure decisions discretionary with the district
court is unsupportable. Section 3742 says, first, that
the standard of review for findings of fact by district
courts in sentencing proceedings is the same as it is
for findings of fact in all other proceedings, that is,
whether the finding is "clearly erroneous." But a
"clearly erroneous" standard of review for factual
determinations, while certainly deferential, represents
an increase in control by appellate courts over preguidelines practice because, before the guidelines,
there were no findings of fact at sentencing and no
appellate reviews of the non-findings.
The segment of § 3742 on which the Court
principally relies is from the 1988 amendment which
added the mandate that courts of appeals "give due
deference to the district court's application of the
guidelines to the facts." 5 At first glance, this passage
has superficial appeal as a statutory basis for the
Court's result in Koon. The determination of whether
a departure under § 5K2.0 is available on the facts of a
particular case looks like an "application of the
guidelines to the facts." The obvious difficulty is that
every other "application of the guidelines to the facts"
performed by a district judge-e.g., every decision to
add two levels because of Fact A or subtract two
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levels because of Fact B-has hitherto been held to be
reviewable de novo (where questions of guideline
interpretation predominate) 6 or, at the least, for7 clear
error (where the factual inquiry predominates).
There is no indication in Koon that the Court intends
to sweep aside all this previous caselaw regarding the
standard of review to be applied to determinations of
which guideline range is applicable, yet the Court
holds out § 3742(e) as authority for the view that the
decision of whether to depart from the guidelines for
a particular defendant is discretionary with the
district judge. "Abuse of discretion," at least as the
term is generally understood, is a more deferential
standard than either "clearly erroneous" or de novo
review. It is an untenable proposition that the SRA
says, or Congress intended it to mean, that a district
judge should be subject to less central supervisory
control when determining that the sentence mandated
by the guidelines simply should not apply to Defendant Smith than when the same judge is deciding
whether Smith merits an enhancement for possessing
a firearm in the course of a bank robbery.
In short, the Court's effort to find support in the
Sentencing Reform Act for its conclusion in Koon must
be deemed unsuccessful.
The Argument from Institutional Competence
The second arrow in the Court's quiver is the
claim that district courts are better suited than
appellate courts to make the determination of whether
a departure is appropriate in a particular case. Under
the SRA and the guidelines, no departure is permitted
"unless the court finds that there exists a circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines...."" The Commission
described its task as "carving out a 'heartland,' a set of
typical cases embodying the conduct that each
guideline describes," and the task of district courts in
making a departure decision as identifying the
"atypical case, one to which a particular guideline
linguistically applies but where conduct significantly
differs from the norm ....9
The majority opinion in Koon asserts that,
"District courts have an institutional advantage over
appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines
cases than appellate courts do. In 1994, for example,
93.9% of Guidelines cases were not appealed."10 This
passage seems straightforward. In fact, on close
examination, it is not at all clear what the Court
means. If, on the one hand, the Court is saying
nothing more than that district court judges as a group
see more cases than appellate court judges as a group,
the statement is true, but irrelevant. District court
judges are not a collective intelligence; they are a
collection of individuals who make all their sentencing decisions, particularly their decisions as to
whether a particular case is outside of the "heart-

land," alone.
Thus, a district judge making a departure
decision can only be said to have greater competence
in assessing what is or is not "typical" if he or she
"sees" more guidelines cases than does an appellate
judge.
But if the Koon majority means to imply that each
district court judge "sees" more guidelines cases than
each appellate court judge, the Court is objectively
wrong-on not one, but two, grounds.
First, there are roughly five district court judges
for every judge on a court of appeals." Assume for
the sake of illustration that in 1994 each district court
judge handled twenty guidelines cases. If so, there
would be 100 guidelines cases sentenced at the
district court level for every appellate judge. If the
figure cited by the Supreme Court for percentage of
guidelines cases appealed in 1994 (6.1%) were correct,
there would be roughly six guidelines appeals per
sitting appellate judge. But because three judges sit
on each appellate panel, each appellate judge would
hear eighteen guidelines appeals per year. In short,
even if the appellate statistics used by the Court were
accurate, they would prove that district and appellate
court judges see roughly the same number of
guidelines cases.
Second, the figure for rate of appeals in guidelines
cases upon which the Court bases its argument is
wrong, for at least three reasons:
(1) The majority opinion cites a letter from a
member of the Sentencing Commission staff as
authority for its claim that in 1994, "93.9% of Guidelines cases were not appealed." However, the Court
mischaracterizes the data in the letter. The letter
provides figures from Fiscal Years 1993 and 1994 for
the "% of Guidelines Sentences 'Not Appealed' by
End of FY 1995" (92.7% for FY 1993, and 93.9% for FY
1994).12 The letter states that, "The Commission's
databases do not include the number of filings in the
appellate courts, only the number of published or
unpublished orders and opinions issued. Thus, the
term 'not appealed' refers to those cases for which the
appellate courts have not issued an order or opinion
on a sentencing-related issue."1 3 In short, the number
quoted by the Court reflects, not the percentage of
guidelines cases that were not appealed, but only
those guidelines cases sentenced during FY 1994 that,
by the end of FY 1995, had gone completely through
the appellate process to the issuance of a written
opinion.
(2) The number selected from the Commission's
letter obviously underreports the percentage of
guidelines cases in which appeals are filed and a
sentencing issue is raised. This can be demonstrated
conclusively from the Commission's own published
data. In 1994, there were 39,971 cases sentenced
under the guidelines. 4 In the same year, according to
the Commission, 3,942 appeals involving a guidelines
issue were decided.'- Consequently, the ratio of
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guidelines appeals concluded to guidelines cases
sentenced in 1994 was not 6.1%, but 9.86%. In 1995,
the rate of guidelines appeals was 11.24%.16
Calculating an appeals rate for guidelines cases
by comparing the number of cases sentenced in a
particular year to the number of appeals involving
sentencing issues reported by the Commission in the
same year is concededly imprecise. Indeed, if there
had been dramatic fluctuations in either the number
of cases sentenced or the number of appeals over the
last few years, it could be misleading, because: (a) the
Commission does not report appeals until they are
decided; (b) sentencing appeals often take more than
one year; and (c) therefore, sentencing appeals are
often not reported in the same year as the original
sentencing. Nonetheless, between 1992 and 1995, the
total number of guidelines sentencings each year
averaged about 40,000.17 In 1994 and 1995, the
number of sentencing appeals reported in each year
by the Commission was roughly 4,000.18 In short,
according to the Sentencing Commission's figures,
and even allowing for lag time, at any given moment
about 10% of the cases sentenced under the guidelines
are being appealed.
(3) There are strong indications that the Commission is dramatically underreporting the number of
criminal appeals involving sentencing issues. According to figures collected by the Administrative
Office of the Courts, there were 8,057 appeals raising
sentencing issues in FY 1994 and 7,481 such appeals in
1995.19 If true, this would mean that roughly 20% of
all cases sentenced under the guidelines result in
appeals raising guidelines issues.
In sum, if we apply what appears to be more
accurate appellate data to our illustrative case, we see
that if there are 100 guidelines cases sentenced at the
district court level for every appellate judge, somewhere between 10% and 20% of that number, or 10 to
20 actual cases, will reach the court of appeals.
Because each appellate case requires three judges,
every appellate judge will hear thirty to sixty guidelines cases, as compared to the twenty heard by each
district court judge. In short, it appears that each
appellate court judge hears not fewer, but between
50% and 200% more guidelines cases than does each
district court judge. Consequently, the empirical
premise on which the Supreme Court bases its
argument for the superior competence of district
court judges to determine the "usualness" of a
guidelines case collapses.
Beyond the Numbers
Even if the Supreme Court were right in asserting
that district court judges "see" more guidelines cases
than appellate judges, the institutional competence
argument in favor of granting broad discretionary
departure authority to district judges would still
stand on shaky ground. The question at issue when
considering the possibility of a departure is whether

there exists a "circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines," and it is very difficult to contend that district
court judges are better suited for deciding what the
Commission considered than are appellate judges.
Furthermore, even if one shifts the ground of
inquiry, as the Koon court tries to do, from what the
Commission intended to a determination of whether a
particular case is unusual, or atypical, or outside the
norm, one is left with the questions: Unusual where?
Atypical as compared to what group of other cases?
The norm where? And as defined by whom?
District Judge Jones in Miami is better suited than
an appellate judge to determine that defendant Smith
is "unusual" or "atypical" as compared to other
defendants who have appeared in her courtroom.
Judge Jones may even be better than the court of
appeals in determining the "norm" in her courthouse
or in all the courthouses in the Southern District of
Florida. The problem, of course, is that the guidelines are not a local, or even regional, enterprise.
They exist not merely, or even primarily, because
pre-guidelines sentences were disparate between
judges in the same courthouse, but because local
norms were perceived to vary widely and unjustly.
The "norm" of which we must speak if the guidelines
are not to be deprived of their fundamental justification is a national norm.
Which brings us back to the central question of
who is empowered by the Sentencing Reform Act to
define the norm. Before Koon, I think it fair to say that
appellate courts reviewing departures under § 3553(b)
understood their task as one of ascertaining the
boundaries the Commission meant to set on the
national "heartland" of cases for which no departure
is appropriate. The question of whether a particular
set of aggravating or mitigating circumstances was
"adequately taken into consideration by the Commission" was construed as a way of asking whether the
circumstances at issue fell inside or outside of that
boundary. Viewed this way, the question was, at the
very least, a "mixed question of fact and law" and not
a discretionary choice for the trial judge.
Koon, by contrast, can be read to imply that
sentencing judges may depart based on a disagreement with the "adequacy" of the Commission's
judgment in setting the boundaries of the heartland,and
that appellate courts should generally defer to such
conclusions. The language of the Koon opinion can be
squared with the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) only
if the Court is suggesting a radical revision of the
relationship of judges generally, and district judges in
particular, to the guidelines. However, the Sentencing
Reform Act, no matter how ingeniously it is tortured,
will not admit of the interpretation that district court
judges have a roving warrant to depart from the
guidelines whenever they disagree with the judgments of the Commission. It is difficult to conceive of
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the Supreme Court itself traveling too much farther
down the path hinted at in Koon, if for no other reason
than the Justices' undoubted awareness that any
sustained effort to regain by judicial fiat the courts'
former untrammeled sentencing discretion would
certainly meet with a furious congressional backlash.
The outlook in the lower federal courts, however,
seems a good deal less certain.
The hopeful view of Koon is that sentencing
judges will expand their use of the departure power
enough to ameliorate some of the harsher guidelines
outcomes, but will move with sufficient restraint that
they will neither imperil the guidelines structure in
fact, nor be perceived as doing so by Congress, the
bar, or the public. The less optimistic, and I fear more
likely, prognosis is that the combination of incidents
of intemperance among the district courts and general
confusion among the courts of appeals" will lead to
amendments by the Commission to the guidelines,
and by Congress to the SRA, which will narrow the
range of district court departure authority even more
than was the case before Koon.

NOTES
116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
2 Id. at 2046.

Id. at 2045.
4

In cases where the guidelines range exceeds 24

months, the district court is obliged to explain his choice of
sentence within that range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).
1 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Quoted in Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2046.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Patterson,962 F.2d 409 (5th
Cir. 1992) (reviewing de novo the questions of whether and
how to group defendant's offenses).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir.
1992) (reviewing determination for clear error that defendant
knew laundered money was criminally derived). See
generally United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.
1984) (excellent general analysis of standards of appellate

review for mixed questions of law and fact).
8 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); § 5K2.0.
9 Ch.1, pt. A, intro. comment 4(b).
10 Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047.
11 The ratio varies slightly from circuit to circuit, and
depending on whether one counts senior judges. Compare
the roster of appellate court judges listed at 85 F.3d VII
(1996) with the roster of district court judges listed at 927 F.
Supp. VII (1996).
12 Memorandum from Pamela G. Montgomery,
Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission, to
Doris Jensen, Librarian, U.S. Supreme Court, July 2, 1996.
13 Id.
11 See United States Sentencing Commission, Annual
Report 1994, at 31.
15 See id. at 139, Table M. I say that "at least" 3,942
cases involved sentencing issues, because the Commission's
system for capturing appellate data (which relies on a
combination of material the Commission "requested" from
courts of appeals and material gleaned from searches of
Westlaw, id. at 133) plainly does not capture all guidelines
appeals. Moreover, it is somewhat unclear from the
Commission's remarks in its 1994 Annual Report whether
the 3,942 appeals in the Commission's appellate database is
a count of cases or defendants. If Table M reflects cases rather
than defendants, it underreports guidelines appeals by
counting multi-defendant appeals as a single case.
16 In 1995, there were 38,500 guidelines defendants. See
United States Sentencing Commission, Annual Report 1995,
at 41. There were 4,314 cases involving guidelines appeals.
See id. at 133, Table 52.
17 See id. at 41.
11 The Commission reported 3,942 appeals involving
sentencing issues in 1994. See Annual Report 1994, at 139,
Table M. In 1995, the Commission reported 4,314 such
appeals. See Annual Report 1995, at 153, Table 52.
19Judicial Business of the United States Courts, Report of
the Director, 1995.
20See, e.g., United States v. Sherpa, 97 F.3d 1239, 1244-45,
1996 WL 571175 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Koon for the proposition that a sentencing court may ignore a jury's findings of
facts necessary to the verdict in making factual rulings at
sentencing).
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